Many North American power utilities have large numbers of electrical substations that operate well but are not connected to a central Energy Management System (EMS). These islands of critical infrastructure are equipped with legacy devices running on proprietary protocols. Impossible to monitor without someone physically visiting them, such substations prevent utilities from delivering on the promise of the smart grid.

While IT and controls engineering traditionally have been two widely separate disciplines, the adoption of Ethernet for industrial networking has increasingly brought the two worlds together. Then along comes the Industrial Internet of Things (IoT), with more and more connected devices. Now the need to marry engineering expertise with IT smarts is vital for keeping production networks humming.

The adoption of new technologies in  electrical substations has improved communications, but it has also made these networks more vulnerable to cyber threats. In the past, electrical substations were designed to be safe, easy to use and reliable. Security wasn’t a concern. As the substations have become more complex in their design, cyber security became a priority.

If you are more comfortable programming PLCs than implementing cyber security measures this series of blogs is for you. Its goal is to give you an overview of the security functions built into network devices so you can implement the ones that are appropriate for your application.

The malware campaign known as Dragonfly has surprised those of us concerned with industrial cyber security on several fronts. Initially, it was notable as the first malware since Stuxnet in 2010 to specifically target Industrial Control Systems (ICS) components.