Around the world countries are trying to combat their dependency on oil and reduce their carbon emissions. A key strategy for achieving this in some regions is a focused effort on dramatically improving rail infrastructure. As a result many rail operators are striving to improve capacity without having to take on expensive and disruptive civil engineering projects. One solution is Communications Based Train Control (CBTC) systems which increase utilization of existing rail infrastructure.

An important best practice for industrial security is to implement a Defense in Depth strategy. With this approach, multiple layers of defense are implemented, in contrast to just one defense mechanism, such as a single firewall. A complementary best practice used as part of a Defense is Depth strategy is Zones and Conduits, as defined in the ISA IEC 62443 standard. This involves segmenting the network into zones of devices with similar security requirements and using conduits to restrict the communication between zones.

Electric energy operators around the world are working to increase reliability, resiliency and capacity with smart investments in new technologies. This includes Stadtwerke Karlsruhe Netzservice GmbH (SWKN), the municipal utility that provides electricity, gas, water and heating to the 300,000 inhabitants of the city of Karlsruhe in southwestern Germany.

The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is changing both automation systems and business systems. Standard Internet technologies are penetrating deeper into control systems and many more things are being connected to the factory network. In parallel, additional data is flowing into and out of industrial control systems, leading to business benefits such as better asset utilization, lower energy consumption and improved supply chain management.

Energy and electric utility organizations are facing a range of challenges requiring a reevaluation of the cyber security within their industrial control networks, endpoints and controllers. On the one hand, operators have to face losing access to phone lines, securing transmission substations, meeting pressing NERC CIP audit requirements and worrying about Internet connections to vital systems. On the other hand, they are confronted with data and media coverage (eg. Ukraine power outage) that indicate an increase in cyberattacks on energy Industrial Control Systems (ICS).